Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

10-1-1972

Optimal Savings and Foreign Debt Policy with Export Revenue
Uncertainty
James McCabe
David Sibley

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
McCabe, James and Sibley, David, "Optimal Savings and Foreign Debt Policy with Export Revenue
Uncertainty" (1972). Discussion Papers. 169.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/169

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONO:-TJC r,nJ~WTH CENTER
YALE UNI' 7ERSITY

Rox 1987, Yale Station
!~ew Haven, Connecticut

CENTE~

DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 161

Ootimal Savings and ~oreifn nebt Policy
with Export ~evenue Uncertainty

James "kCabe
and

Davirl Siblev

Note:

Center Discussion ~apers are ryreliminary materials
circulated to stimulate discussions and critical
COl'lll'lent.
References in puhlications to Discus
sion Papers should be cleared with the author to
protect the tentative character of these papers.

It has been argued that, in determining the optimal rate foreign
debt accumulation, one should consider the variability of export earnings,
in addition to such parameters as the domestic saving rate, the marginal
1 This
propensity to import, and the projected mean export growth rate.
is obvious from the point of view of lending countries in that the possi
bility of defaulting on debt service payments increases with the variance
of export revenues.

However, the uncertainty associated with variability

in export revenues may also have an impact on optimal debt policy in the
case where maximization of the borrowing country's welfare is the sole

consideration.
While heuristic arguments have been presented in the foreign debt
literature sponsored by the World Bank, for a rigorous demonstration of
this point we must refer to an analogous result in household savings theory.
The fluctuation in export revenue may be broken down into two components:
one attributable to random variation in sales an~""~ ~n r~nrlrnii v~~i~tfcn
in the world price of the exportable.

In the case where export sales are

unaffected by govermnent policy, even though they are random it can be shown
that, under certain assumptions about risk aversion, the optimal rate of
debt accumulation will be reduced as export revenues become more uncertain
and the path of total gross investment remains unchanged.

This is true for

the same reason that the household can be shown to have a precautionary
demand for savings as a result of uncertainty in wage income.

1

See, for example, Avromovic, !!_

!!.•

An increase

[1].

We express our appreciation to Richard Brecher, Dale. Henderson, Steven
Salant, Jeffrey Shafer and Joseph Stiglitz for their helpful comments.
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in net foreign capital inflow allows the borrowing country_ to consume more
in the current period (with total gross investment fixed) but also results
in greater debt service payments and lower consumption in subsequent time
periods, which are associated with uncertainty in the level of export revenues.
Since the variance of consumption is an increasing function of the variance
of the export revenues, there may well be a precautionary motive for decreasing
the rate of debt accumulation when export revenues become more uncertain
(although their projected mean rate of increase remains constant).

Debt

accumulation is simply dis-savings, and a rise in export uncertainty in an
aggregate model creates an effect on optimal net foreign inflow which is
exactly opposite to the increase in the household's precautionary savings
demand induced by future wage income becoming more uncertain.

By

means of

a two-period optimization mode, Leland has shown that precautionary savings
increase with uncertainty when the household utility function has the property
of diminishing absolute risk aversion [5].
Aside from presenting the aggregate debt accumulation version of
this model in detail, we shall demonstrate in this paper that the dampening
effect of export-revenue uncertainty on foreign borrowing is critically
dependent on the assumed exogenous and policy variables, and the parameteri
zation of the utility function.

For example, one important variable assumed

to be exogenous in the preceding discussion, in addition to export revenues,
is investment.
Debt accumulation has a definite bearing on the optimal domestic
saving and investment policies of a developing country, and the optimal

trajectories for these two variables over time should be determined simul
taneously.

In a system in which both net foreign capital inflow and domestic

3

savings are policy vari.s.bl es, and hence total investme nt is allowed to vary,
it is possible for domestic savings to act on an inter-te mporal averag:l.n g
device which offsets the consump tion impact of variatio n in export earnings .
We shall test whether or not this type of savings behavio r influenc es the
sensitiv ity of optimal debt accumul ation to changes in the variance of export
earning s.

Further, we use a dynamic progrann ning model to derive a closed

form solution for the optimal feedback relation ship between domesth sav::.,,gs
and export earnings .

Another objectiv e of this paper :!.s to investig ate the effect of making
export output a variable which is influenc ed at least indirec tly by economic
policy.

We conside r cases in which both the price of exports and their

producti on and/or sales level are uncertai n.

Our main results a.re tiaseci

upon the assumpti on that the interest r~te on new debt depends on the level
of total debt and GNP is a linear function of capital.

We demonst rate that,

given these assumpt ions, making both domestic savings and net foreign capital

inflow policy variable s will cause optimal debt accumul ation to be independ ent
of uncerta inty provided that the volume of exports is exogeno us.

When export

producti on is endogeno us the dampenin g effect of revenue uncerta inty on
foreign borrowin g depends on paramet erizatio n of the utility function .

In Part I, static systems are presente d which relate consump tion to
real exports, the terms of trade, debt service payment s, and domestic savings
in two cases:

(1) where the voltmte of exports is exogeno us; and (2) where

it is endogeno us.

In Parts II and III dynamic models based on these st~tic

.
systems are develope d and both two-peri od and T-period solution s are analyzed
In Part IV, we use existing empiric al studies to test the rea.)-wo rld

I..

applicability of the assumptions on which the two models are based.

We also cite

evidence indicating that the direction of response to export-revenue fJuct.uation in the case of

several countries

is consistent with that obtained

from our optimizing model with exogenous exports.

In the concluding section

the results are sunnnarized.

I.

The Static Model
The static model is based on the assumption that there are two commo
Good 1 is a primary product export, not domestically consumed,

dities.

Good 2 is an import-competing commodity used for final investment and con
sumption purposes.
2,

w(2)

Suppose that the real wage expressed in terms of Good

is subject to the constraint

w(2)

where

W(2)

~w<n

is an exogenously determined real minimum wage, and that th,-:

economy is in competitive equilibrium,

In addition, assume that there are

two factors of production, capital and labor, and that there is constant
returns to scale in production in the two sectors.

Then, as Brecher [3]

has shown, with constraint (1.1) binding, labor will be openly unemployed
and the transformation surface will be linear in the region of incomplete
specialization.

The transformation surface in this region, corresponding

to a given real minimum wage and aggregate capital stock K is depicted
as

T T
1 2

in Figure 1.

The variables measured along each of the axes in

this case represent the real value added of the commodity produced in a
particular sector.

5

Given that good 2 is the numeraire commodity and the home country
is a price taker in world trade with a variable export tax, both gross
domestic product at internal prices and gross domestic product at world
prices may be determined in the following manner.
A

price of commodity 1 to that of commodity 2,

p ,

The ratio of the internal
is uniquely determined

by the specified real minimtnn wage as a result of the Samuelson relation
ship between factor and relative commodity prices [5].

Hence there arE

an infinite number of commodity price lines~ each having the slope

-1/p.

Denote the quantity produced and sold of the exported good by

The

E.

commodity price line corresponding to the specified value of

E,

slope is determined by the real minimum wage, is depicted as

"'"
pp

1.

whose
in Figure.

It is clear that, under these conditions, GDP at internal prices,

is given by the distance

oa,

on the horizontal axes. 1

terms this variable is a linear function of
stock

E

In algebraic

and the aggregate capital

K ;

Q

=

aE

+

(1.2)

bK •

Denote the capital output ratio in the sector producing commodity
z(i) .

where

Q ,

Then it can be shown that
z(l)/z(2)

a=

(p -

z(l)/z(2))

and

b

=

i

by

l/z(2) ,

is the inverse of the slope of the transformation surface.

Brecher has shown that when the commodity measured along the vertical axes
is relatively labor intense the absolute value of the slope transformation
surface will be greater than that of the commodity price line.

This implies

1

An increase in total capital stock from K to K will cause a r,r..r.':> :~.
outward movement in the transformation surface from T T
to T T
1 2

12

will be positive.

a

that the export coefficient

The export coeffid.£,nt

will be negative in the case where the import-competing commodity, good
2, is relatively labor intense.
It is assumed that the home country is a price taker in world trade,
and that the export tax or subsidy on good 1 determined by the difference
between the constant internal price ratio,
price ratio,

P.

and the external commodity

p,

Gross domestic product at world prices,

depicted as a distance

ob

Y,

may be

along the horizontal axes in Figure l when good

2 is the numeraire commodity.
This variable is determined by the relationship

Y = bK +[a+

(p -

;)]E = Q + (p - ~)E.

Denote the average interest rate on debt by

by the price of good 2) by

D.

r

and total debt (deflated

Then gross national product at world

prices GNP is given by the identity

Consumption

C, may be determined as difference between gross national

product at world prices and gross domestic saving

C =GNP+ F - I= Q +
where

F

(p -

S ,

or by the identity

p)E - rD + F - I

is net foreign capital inflow and

I

(1.5)

is gross investment (all

expressed in terms of the numeraire commodity, good 2).
This approach is reasonable in the case where the price of the eyN,...-t:
cormnodity is random and the real output of good 1 can be viewed as

exo9.01v. ~•:,

7

T'

1

e

.,,

0
0
bO

'

''
A

''

p

T'2

0

''

a

p
b

ptio n)
good 2 (in ves tme nt and con sum

FIGURE 1
modity Pri ce Lin es
Tra nsf orm atio n Sur fac e and Com
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given.

1.

This is not true when control variables affect real output of good

To formulate this latter case let the production function of sector 1

take the form
Q(l) = BF(K(i), L(l))

where

Q(l)

is output,

in sector 1, and

K(l)

(1.6)

is capital stock,

L(l)

B is a multiplicative factor which could be random, e.g., re

flecting the influence of weather on export output.
ratio in both sectors by
k(l) •

is employed labor

tu

Denote the wage rental

and the capital-labor ratio in sector 1 by

It can be shown that, given constant returns to scale and internal

price certainty for commodity 1, the capital-labor ratio of the profit maxi
mizing firm in sector 1 will still be determined by the relation

f(k(l))

f'(k(l)) - k(l) = m
where
1

f(k(l))

= F(K(l)/L(l),

1)

and

= f' = oF/ok(l)

f'(k(l))

1

Since

In this case, the firm's objective function takes the form

EU(PBF - wL - rK)
where E is the expected value operator, U is the well-behaved utility
function, p is the exogenously given price and w and r are the labor
wage and capital rental rates respectively. The first order-condition s yield

Eu{PB I- r) = o
EU' (

PB

I -w)

=0

•

From these relationships, (1. 7) may be obtained by assuming constant returns
to scale.

9

with diminishing returns to scale,

f"(k(l)) < 0,

~ >
dk

it can be shown that al-

0

ways holds and that k(l) is uniquely determined by the wage rental ratio
associated with the specified real wage (expressed in terms of good 2).
,.

Consequentl y the capital labor ratio is independent of random parameter

B

However, the capital-out put ratio is given by the expression
k(l)

Bf(k(l))

which depends on the random variable.

A

Since the expression for the transfor

mation surface relating output of good 2,
Q(l) ,

(1.8)

= Z(l)

Q(2) ,

to output of good 1,

takes the form
_

1

zo)

Q( 2 ) - Z(2) K - Z(2) Q(l)

the problem may be viewed as one in which the intercept of the transformat ion
surface on the vertical axis changes but not on the horizontal axis as

,.

When capital is allocated completely to
,.
1
Q(2) =2(2) K which is independent of B • This type of pro-

result of random variation in B.
sector 2,

duction variability is illustrated by the shift from

T T2
1

to

TiT

2

in

Figure 1.
Under these conditions, it seems reasonable to assume that output
of good 2 is specified but not good 1, since no uncertainty is associated
with the production of the former connnodity and it is dubious that resources
A

move instantaneo usly into or out of sector 2 to compensate for changes in

B.

10

~

Let

= 1/Z(l) ,

then the output of good 1

Q(l)

is given by the

formula

= K~ - Z(2)8Q(2)

Q(l)
where

Q(2)

is specified output level of good 2.

This formulation implies

an expression for aggregate consumption of the form

C

= p~(K

- Z(2)Q(2))

The expression capital in sector 1,

K(l) ,

K - Z(2)Q(2)
· and

K(l)

is assumed to be positive.

+ Q{2) - S.
is

= K(l)
Therefore, a random increase in the

output capital ratio in sector 1 will cause consumption to increase, with
world relative commodity prices

II.

(P)· fixed, and vice versa.

Dynamic Models with Exogenous Exports
The optimal debt accumulation model is precisely analogous to Leland's

optimal savings

model for the household in the case where gross investment

.is held constant, net foreign capital inflow is controlled, and uncertainty
is confined to export revenues.
random, and that
standard deviation

P

Assume that

E

is exogenous, possibly

is a random variable with a fixed mean and a constant
~

p

Then we may derive a new random variable,

which is given by the function

~
E ,

11

E = (p - p)E + aE.
Since this function is linear in
ation of

E is simply

Ea

p

•

with

p

(2.1)

constant, the standard devi-

E

1

The social welfare function for the two-period model takes the form

(2.2)

where

~

is the rate of sod al discount (ass'.l!!!ed constant),

O>

is the ex-

pected value operator, and the subscripts 1 ~nd 2 refer to consumption in
The second utility function for each

the first and second time periods.
time period,

is always restricted to meet the regularity conditions

U,

D'(C)

>

and

0

1•·

{G)

is kno,,m and

In the ·initial time period, P

<
E

(2. 3)

0 •

1

is equal to a speci-

fied value, whereas the value of the expression in the second time period,
-is uncertain.

We assume not only that gross inv8stment per laborer

in the initial time period

(1 )
1

is fixed but also, without loss of generality,
The final assumption

that gross investment is zero in the terminal period.

upon which our model is based is that the interest rate on new debt is an
2

D.

.increasing function of total debt

Asst.nning that world capital markets

are imperfect in this sense is a way of capturing risk aversion on the part

11£ E were random,
Var(E)

=·'p2cl-E
+

~E2 cl- +PEcov(P,E) + [EP+ cov(P,E)J2
p

- -2
2
2(a-p)(c 2 - P(E
-:,~
A

?
+°E)) + (a-p)
A

2 -2
(E

,. r.

where
2

•

'l'lns

1

is the mean of

F

and

!

is the mean of

E •

+

2

O'E)

12

of lendors.

This assumption also implies that the average interest rate

on total debt,

r,

is an increa~ing function of the total debt ratio,

i.e.,

r = r(D)
(2.1+)

r'

>0

•

Consequently, total interest payments are give~ by the function

rD = r(D)•D

= TI(D)

(2.5)

,

the first derivative of which takes the form

0 = r + r' (D)D >

(2.6)

0 •

The value of this expression represent" the amount by which an extra unit
of debt raises the total cost of borrowing.
1
The optimization problem is one of choosing a value of net foreign

capital inflow in the initial time period

(F )
1

which maximizes

(2. 7)

The first order condition for the maximum in this case is simply

(2.8)

1we assume no labor force growth, at zero cost in generality.
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where

0=

Denote the variance of

TT' (d)

it follows that

dF/oof <

0

~
E

by

2

(J~

E

•

Then from (2.8)

provided that the utility function exhibits

decreasin g absolute risk aversion.

1

This result breaks down int.he 2-period case when domestic savings
rather than total investmen t is held fixed, and in the T as well as the 2period case when both domestic savings and net foreign capital inflow are
allowed to vary.

The 2-perio<l model with initial domestic saving,

s1 ,

fixed and no savings in the terminal period takes the form

The first order condition in this case is

(2.10)

which implies that

b

=

'/J •

In other words, one will accumulat e debt until

the increment al cost of borro~ing is equal to the constant social marginal

product of capital,
1

b.

Here the debt accumulat ion is independe nt of export

Absolute risk aversion is defined as -U"/U' , and can be interpret ed as
reflectin g the individua l's willingne ss to undertake a bet of fixed size.
It is generally agreed that absolute risk aversion should decline with
·wealth; a sufficien t condition for this is that the third derivativ e of
the utility function, U"' , be positive. In the present instance, this
so that
also guarantee s the convexity of U' in l

14

revenue uncertainty as measured by

°E'.

This result also holds when

is allowed to vary in the two-period example.
the first-order conditions
2
err,

s

1

In that case, differentating

oL/os 1 = 0 and oL/oF 1 = 0 with respect to

with decreasing absolute risk aversion yields

(2.11)

Thus, when uncertainty increases, optimal sa·,11:ngs policy takes the form of

c 2 to the right in order to compensate for its higher

shifting the mean of
variance.

The T-period case may be analyzed by means of dynamic programming.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that total capital stock financed
by foreign debt

(Kf)

is controlled, rather than net foreign capital inflow.

This variable should be distinguished from the stock of imported capital
and in the case where the depreciation rate is zero, it is identically equal
to foreign debt,

D.

Making this simplification affects nothing.

We assume that capital financed by foreign debt
financed by domestic savings

(Kd)

(Kf)

and capital

are homogenous factors of production.

Given that the return on total capital is

b,

consumption in period

t

is given by the expression:
C
t

= b(Kd t + Kf)
+ Et - r t Dt - St •
t

(2.12)

Assume that welfare is intemporally additive with a constant social
discount rate, and that the utility function is one with constant absolute

15

risk aversion of the form

U(C)

Ti < 0

J

e =

base of natural logarithm s.

(2 .13)

In this case utility is always negative; but this is irrelevan t since

all

we

are concerned with is the ordering of preferenc es and the function

is well behaved in the sense that the following regularit y condition s are
met:

u' >

fi

V

U"

1

<

0 •

The assumptio n 0£ constant absolute risk aversion is objection able
in a portfolio choice model.

However, since the value of export revenues
In addition, for getting a

is exogenous , th:!.s problem is not relevant here.

closed solution to our problem, the constant absolute risk aversion formu
lation is convenien t.
The planning authority 's objective is to
T

max S [ !:
t-=O
...., .·
_,
~
S
{k

F'

_,

~ = ~ ' kF
T

T-1

' ~

T-2

,

• • ., ~

>

0

The dynamic prograunni ng problem may be solved by starting first with
the terminal period and then working back in time. Assuming that there is
no domestic saving in this period, the end-perio d maximiza tion is simply

16

(2.14)

The first-ord er condition is simply

and

r~)•tc;

we denote by

by

n*.

J0 }

so

...
Jr,_,

•.:

-

denote

,- 1 {b)

The maximized value of utility in the end-perio d

~

'I

We notice t'har

ST-l

~ = b ;

2.?pear~ as a paraneter in the end-perio d problem;

is chosen to

max

rkFT-1 ,

, '!'\

S'P-1,
.,_

e e
+ -1- r.;:;;.1+5

The first-ord er condition for

(2.15)

1'1

implies, as before that

independe ntly of savings.

ST-l

can be solved for

ST-l,

*

and

'Tl < 0

J

0 ,

so

The first order condition for

giving us

'
Hencefort h

b =

will denote a,, optimal value.

(2 .16)

Since e i1E is convex in

E

17

>

0 •

Also, we have a marginal propensity to save out of the period-to-period
random draws

of

Et

1/l+b ,

or about .25 for most LDC's.

Having

we may write the maximized value of expected utility from periods
to

as

T

=

t3 1

Where

(2 .17)

~l

can be determined from (2.16).

J

Having

Again

1

*

= kF

kF

T-2
slope equal to
case

T-1

,

we can now go back a period and

and the savings rule takes the same form as (2.16), with

1/l+b,

but a different intercept.

In the infinite horizon

18

(2.18)

-

-bE )b

a=

constant =

~e l+b

1+!

(

lb

1
l+b

s*

The dynamic programming problem is to find

'n[b(k +k*)+ bE ]

~,,

-e

where

-1)

F

'n[b(k +k*)-n*+E-s*J

l+b

D

= e

F

-

;;-

I

such that

'n[B(k +k*+s*)+ bE l
D
F
l+b

l
+
1::e
1+~ lorj

~
E •

denotes the current realized value of

1

~e

b (b 1+b

l+b

ln ( l+~

•

s* we find

b+l
b

b

Jlli!)b+l

i1°

Solving for

+ b - 1+b )
l+~

(2 .19)

Again,
Starting from the end period, when we specified zero savings, the
savings function drifts up over time with

a constant slope until the infinite

horizon savings function (2.19) is reached.
foreign-financed capital,

KF,

Throughout the planning period

is at a constant level

~,

independent

of savings behavior and uncertainty.
We can sum up the influence of export revenue uncertainty as follows:
(a)

F

controlled,

I

fixed:

0F/oe1E2 < o

(b)

F

controlled,

s

fixed:

oF/ooE2

(c)

F ,

S both controlled:

(d)

F ,

I

controlled:

=

o

2
oF/~ = 0,

oF/ooE2 I:

0 ,

2
oS/o~ > 0

oI/OO'E2

,j:. 0

signs unclear.
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In cases (a)-(c) the effect of policy response to increased export uncer
tainty is to shift over the mean of the distribution of future consumption
in order to compensate for its increased variance; case (d) is ambiguous.
In addition, it can be shown, in (a), that

oF/oK <

in other words as the current realized value of

E

0

and

oS/o'[ >

0;

rises, optimal savings

rises, and foreign borrowing falls.
Fe should emphasize what features of the models lead to the result

that with

S

fi.xed or controlled, foreign bc.:-rowing is independent of un-

certainty; recall that

If we draw the "opportunity locus" in mean-variance space facing the country
...
for different values of F, we see that it is vertical; varying F affects
only its height (which is maximized when
capital inflow leaves

(J

2
C

unaffected)

that the volume of exports be

b = 0 ).
2

dF/d~

Since, therefore, foreign
Thus, it was crucial

is zero.

-··-----··

'CAVF:,"1;-&.&VU,O •

C

..__________.__________ er2
C

20

Another essential element is the constancy of
duct of capital.

case the effects on

F
1

on

c2

D independent of

K •

are intertwined with those of

net foreign capital inflow is affected by

s1

the marginal pro-

With decreasing returns to capital, the equilibrium level

of debt is not uniquely detennined by

F and
1

b ,

2
er~
.
E '

In the latter
S,

and

here the fact that both

constitute additions to capital stock is relevant.

Finally, the assumption that
interest rate constant, despite
will affect foreign borrowing.

~
E

r' (D) > 0

allows

being exogenous and

=

b
b

'/J ;

with the

mixed, uncertainty

Therefore imperfect capital markets and/or

risk aversion by lending countries is crucial.
We should note very briefly that although with investment fixed in
creased export revenue uncertainty does cause less foreign borrowing, this
does not imply that multilateral commodity price stabiliza"t:ion would raise
foreign borrowing; as we defined

~
E =

E,
"')

E(p - p

+ aE.

So
Var(E)
(2 .21)

and

(2. 22)

21

Clearly, with highly negatively correlations between the internatiorial price
and output of the export good, a rise in

er

p

can stabilize income, since

fluctuations in prices would offset fluctuations in output.

Quite conceivably,

then, price stabilization, brought about by an international agreement,
could lower the optimal level of foreign borrowing.

This highly negative

correlation between international price and domestic output would be most
likely to occur in a country whose normal output of t'!-ie eY.port commo1i. 1·:,·
is large relative to total world production.

Therefore, the response of

optimal borrowing to price stabilization will be less positive, the greater
control the country has over the price of its export~

III.

Variable Export Volume
We recall the alternative definition of consumption given in Part I:

C = P9(k - z(2)q(2)) + q(2) - s - rd •
Throughout this section we fix

q (2) ,

the domestic production of the im,._

portable, so that exports will vary according to the random variable

e

K.

and the capital stock

Let us take the simple cases where savings are fixed and net foreign
capital inflow,
fixed, we got

f,

oF/ocrf

is controlled; when the volume of real exports was
=

0

in this case.

The first order condition is

Again,
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Clearly foreign borrowing is now affected by uncertainty .

treating

F

as an implicit function of

_L
'0::, 2...

Looking at the numerator,

U'

risk aversion, so

9> 0

2

crpe
,.

in

P0,

oEU' /oo;

(EU'P9 - 0EU')

"'Pe

dF

-2-c:
do-P0

to

Specificall y,

is convex in

P9"

given decreasing absolute

The der:i_v:;tive of

•

EU'

P9

with re2pc:::t

is harder; to get a handle on the convexity or concavity of
we assume that the utility functions constant relative risk

.
1
aversion:
C

11

U(c) = -

'Tl '

If we define

U'P9

i1 < 1 .

= H(P9),

We have then, a sufficient condition for convexity or concave of

,.

H"(P9)

<

0

if

{11>0
q (2) - rd

,..

H"(P9)

>

0

if

H(P9)

{,, <

>

0

0

q (2) - rd < 0 .

1Relative

risk aversion defined as -U"•c/u', can be interpreted as re
flecting t,he individual' s willingness to undertake a bet involving a fixed
proportion of his wealth.
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The sign of the derivative of

,..
EU'P9

depends, then, not only on a specific

type of utility function, but on the parameterization of that utility func

tion; and on the sign
positive, since

C

q(2) - rd,

which one would generally assume to be

= P9(•) + q(2) -

rd,

and even with an extensive export

shortfall, countries show positive consumption.
Assuming

~

2

and

0

q(2) - rd> 0,

we have

and

oEU'P9 _

0

2
00'2"
_a_a_P_e~_ _ _P_B<O

dF
d_a_;_e =

~EU' - EU"(P9>2

It is possible, then, to get the dampening effect traditionally imputed to
~

export revenue uncertainty; but had we let

< 0,

the sign of

2

dF/daPe

would be ambiguous; we could easily have a case where export revenue un
certainty increased foreign borrowing.
If we control investment, our problem is

Implying:
oL

au

=

1 t!

"

-u' + l+~ G>U'Pe

01
af 1 = u' -

0 1+v
\

=

o

t.u' = o .
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Differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to

2

crpe

and solving

the resulting system, we find that
(+)

(+)
2
0 1

oEU' P9

oroF 1

r;2,.,.

0

P9

(+)

0
dI
-y-

=

(-)

2
0 1

oEU'
-2-

2

oope"

oF 1

-----------,--J-.-------.. . . < 0

dcrp§

jJj = detenninant of the Jacobian;
constant relative risk aversion with

with

~

~

jJj > 0.

This, again, asstnnes

2: 0 and q(2) - rd> u. Clearly

< 0 we could get the opposite result.

We have seen, then, that the dampening effect of export revenue un
certainty is critically dependent on the specific parameterization of the
utility function, and is certainly not a general result.
There is, however, a more fundamental question involved here:
does uncertainty matter at all?

why

In these previous sections we found that

for two of the four tableaux considered,

~ =

now in this section the equivalent symbol to

b
b,

in dependently of uncertainty;

9

is random, but even if

it weren't, our results would be unchanged, even with savings controlled,

25

which led to

dF/d°E = 0

previously.

If we simplify by considering this

a mean-variance problem, the opportunity locus facing the country if the
value of exports is exogenous is a vertical line; borrowing, as we said above,
affects only the height of the line, leaving the variance of consumption
unchanged.

Therefore one's decision about

F will be made independent of

uncertainty.

C

------------ ------er

C

If

q(2)

is controlled or exogenous, changing

f

does affect the

probability distribution of export revenues, since borrowing augments capital
stock and
e,cvalue of exports)

= ~ (P9 )(K - z (2 )q (2))
2

--2

Var(value of exports) = crp (K - z(2)q(2))
9

If we draw the opportunity locus f~r this case we have the line
in the figure below; the equilibrium point is
the optimal values of

I

and

F •

leading to a new equilibrium point

Changing
A' •

A,

00

from which can be deduced

F rotates the locus to

00'

'

Net foreign capital inflow affects
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the slope and height of the opportunity locus, so uncertainty should be
considered in choosing

F.

0

.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (j
C

A further point to be made is that price stabilizatio n does not

necessarily increase foreign borrowing in this model, either.

It can be

shown that
2

ocrP0 >
-= 0
ocrp <

as

(p = correlation coefficient between
2
dF dcrP0 <
dF
--=0
dcrp =
d o-Pe,. dcrp >

P and

,.
9 ).

Thus,

as

Again, one would expect to find price stabilizatio n dampening foreign borrowing,
where the country is important in world production of the export commodity.
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I

TT

V •

Prelim inary Empir ical Testin g
and
The basic differ ence betwee n the system analyz ed in Part II

of export s
that analyz ed in Part III concer ns wheth er or not the volume
is influe nced by econom ic policy .

Masse l [8] in his empir ical invest iga

not influ
tion of export instab ility assume s that econom ic policy does
This may well be true in a large

ence the size of the export sector .

s sector s
nwnbe r of countr ies where food and raw mater ial based export
are financ ed throug h foreig n direct invest ment.

There is eviden ce,

scheme s
howev er, that in a few develo ping count ries, export promo tion
have been employ ed succe ssfull y [ 4 J.

One of these scheme s has been

ized rates.
the extens ion of long-t erm loans to the export sector at subsid
In this way

Q2

is reduce d by increa sing the absolu te amount of total cap-

ital alloca ted to the export sector .

1

the
In ~ost LDC's, theref ore, the model analyz ed in Sectio n II where
more applic able
volume of export s is exogen ous, though random , seems to be
total capita l
than that presen ted in Sectio n III where the propo rtion of
allo"ca ted to the export sector is contro lled.

But cer•tai n other

1""1::1 i
f"""Y"!~+-t
-.J..-L\....L .............

~

the light
assum ptions applic able to both system s should be analyz ed in
of the availa ble empir ical eviden ce.

The first is the assum ption that

the export ed commo dity is not domes tically consum ed.

This assum ption

produc t expor ts
seems to be most valid in the case of raw mater ials primar y
such as copper and oil.

Linder has argued that indus trial export s involv e

consum ed;
for the most part only those commo dities which are domes tically

1 A precis e formu lation involv ing policy instru ments which determ ine
te paper.
the size of the export sector will be consid ered in a separa
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howevsr, i1' :nos--::. developing countries the industrial export share of
total exports is very small.

It is true, of course, that a significant

proportion of the total production of certain food commodities, used for
export purposes, is consumed domestically.

But less than 50 percent of

the develoi;:,ing countries in Massel's sample domestically consumed more
than 50 percent of the domestic production of these comrnodities [ 8 J.
Mor•eover, the share of food exports domestically consumed did not prove
to be significant explanatory variable determining the degree of export
reve-:--1°.w vaTiation ir1 the colUltries.

Matheson and McKinnon [9 J have

collectec". rlatct which indicates that the variance of GDP at domestic prices,
adjusted fen~ a time trend, is greater in the developing than it is in
the developed countr>ies.

Further, theiP regression analysis indicates

that thex·e is a negative correlation between the real export GDP ratio
and the degree of export variability.

However, these results are not

inconsistent with those implied by the formulations developed in this
paper; Matheson and McKinnon do not attempt to explain the variance of

GDP at world prices, and there is evidence that a great deal of export
revenue variability is attributable to fluctuations in the terms of
trade, arising from shifts in the demand schedule, rather than production
instability in the export sector [8]. Co:1sequently, our simplifying
assumptions, along with presumed association of consumption with export
revenue variability, are for the most part supported by the available
empirical studies.
The closed form solution derived from the dynamic programming model
indicates that level of domestic savings is an increasing function of ex
port revenues.

In other words, along the optimal trajectory, declines in
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dcr;., :_;t.::_r: sav-ings serve to neutra lize the consum ption impact of export
ted
reve,rne shcr•tf alls and increas es in domest ic savings are associa
wi :::, rises in export revenue s above normal levels.

This is consis tent

of
wi tL ')a:-iek' s empiri cal results for Columb ia which uses the terms
of
tro.::h,, not export revenu es, to explain savings and Maizel s' study
12 cv.mtr ies, 8 develop ing and 4 develop ed, [7] and [13].

The regress ion

les, the
ecma t: .i ,)r,_ for domest ic savings involve s two indepen dent variab
vc,J1~ne of exports and GDP at constan t prices.
appt::,,···:e t::: be

2

In Vanek' s study, there

signifi cant positiv e associa tion between domest ic

price
sav.i.ri:o and the terms of trade (define d as the ratio of the world
(.>f-

r:::-:pc2ts to the world price of import s):

Maizel s' study indicat es

with
tl--,a.t· c1omest ic savings are for the most part positiv ely correla ted

eJ,< volume of exports .

Althoug h their specifi cation is not identic al

a
to equatio n (2.10), the estima ted regress ion equatio ns do imply
soldirecti on of associa tion which is consis tent with the closed- form
ution.
Weissk opf's time series regress ions for

17

develop ing countr ies

include GDP, export s, and net foreign capita l inflow , all in real
r
terms, as indepen dent variab les [14]. Since a common GDP price deflato
of
is used to derive these variab les from the expend iture compon ents
to a
GDP measur ed in curren t terms, changes in the export variab le are
ity.
degree attribu table to change s in the world price of the commod
In lO of the 17 countr ies, the export coeffic ient is signifi cantly
d.
positiv e at the five percen t level for the post-w ar periods examine
e
Aside from this result, there is in most cases a signifi cant negativ

!.
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association between net foreign capital inflow and domestic savings.
The sign of this, as well as the export, coefficient is consistent with
the optimization model presented in Part I when gross domestic invest
ment is fixed.

Under these conditions, net foreign capital inflow and

domestic savings react in opposite directions to period-to-period fluctua
tions in export revenues (which are not completely captured by
Weisskopf I s export variable).

If, on the other hand, net foreign

capital inflow is exogenous along with export revenues and gross investment endogenous, as Weisskopf assumes, the

partial derivative of

saving with respect to net foreign capital inflow will be negative
according to our model provided that b > ¢.

In this case of exogenous net

foreign capital inflow, the partial derivative of domestic savings with
respect to export revenues will again be positive at least in the two
period model.

In sum, thenj under two alternative sets of assumptions

about exogenous variables, Weisskopf's savings function estimates
qualitatively conform to the optimal behavior implied by our models.

31

Conclusions
1.

The usual assumption that export revenue uncertainty should

dampen foreign borrowing does not hold generally.

Indeed, if exports

are exogenous, as they probably are in a number of LDC's, in our system
foreign borrowing should proceed to th~ point where the marginal cost
of borrowing(~) is equal to the social marginal product of capital (b),
independently of uncertainty.
2.

To amplify this last point, if exports are exogenous, foreign

borrowing affects only the expected value of consumption, and none of
its higher moments.
3.

Thus, uncertainty will not affect foreign borrowing.

Even in the cases where export revenue uncertainty can be shown

to have a dampening effect on foreign borrowing, if the country is a
large exporter, it can happen that international price stabilization
will destablize export revenues if output uncertainty is present, and
dampen optimal net foreign capital inflow.

4.

Having derived a closed solution for optimal savings behavior

using dynamic programming, we noted that it was consistent with ob
served behavior in several developing countries, at least as regards
the direction of response of this variable to export fluctuation.

To

the extent that this is a consequence of the use of export taxes as
major source of government revenues, reliance on such an indirect tax re
gime will beeconomically efficient according to the exogenous-export
model presented in part II.

However, it must be noted that this conclusion

is critically dependent on the assumption that random fluctuation in
the level of investment is costless.
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5.

The level of foreign exchange reserves is not included as policy

variable in the models.

Working out the case where the average inter

est rate on debt is a decreasing function of this variable, as well as
an increasing function of debt, would be tedious.

It can be easily shown

that such a modification will not affect the qualitative response to
parameter changes in the case of the model presented in Part II, provided
that interest return on exchange reserves is constant and less than the
marginal product of capital in the borrowing country.
6.

In the first models it is true (a) that savings and net foreign

capital inflow react in opposite directions to period-to-period fluctua
tions in the value of exports with investment fixed; and (b) that,
with investment allowed to vary, optimal domestic saving is a decreasing
function of a given level of net foreign capital inflow.

This is con

sistent with cross-sectional findings by Weisskopf [14].

With exports

affected by government policy, as is the case in Part III, this result
may not hold.
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